In this paper we review the methods of measuring the economic gains of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We show that the widely employed event study methodology, whether for short or long event windows, has failed to provide meaningful insight and usable lessons regarding the central question of whether mergers and acquisitions create value. We believe the right way to assess the success and therefore the desirability of M&A is through a thorough analysis of company fundamentals. This will require examining smaller samples of transactions with similar characteristics.
Introduction
The development of the market for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has gone hand in hand with the emergence of world capital markets. The corporate landscape is perpetually being altered by M&A transactions. On a macroeconomic level, mergers come in waves, with one of the most memorable waves gaining momentum during the early 1990s and crashing shortly after the turn of the millennium. During this period, deregulation, a booming world economy combined with rich stock market valuations and solid growth prospects propelled the economic significance of M&A to new heights. Indeed, during the late 1990s, the size, volume and frequency of M&A surpassed anything the world had ever seen. On a microeconomic level, mergers represent massive asset reallocations within and across industries, often enabling firms to double in size in a matter of months. Because mergers tend to occur in waves and cluster by industry, it is easily understood that such transactions may radically and swiftly change the competitive architecture of affected industries. It should therefore come as no surprise that academics have been so intrigued by the merger debate in recent years.
Examining the economic gains (value creation or destruction) of M&A is one of the most coveted research areas in financial economics. The spectacular growth of mergers has justifiably prompted many academics and practitioners to investigate whether such milestone transactions are worth undertaking. More specifically, researchers have sought to find out whether M&A create or destroy value and how the potential gains or losses are distributed among transaction participants. If synergies truly exist between bidders and their targets, M&A should therefore have the potential of representing value-creating corporate events. This question is of utmost importance as its corresponding answer carries important policy implications for regulators and investors. Furthermore, it is vital to assess the aftermath of these colossal transactions, as lessons learned may benefit not only the corporate world, but also society as a whole.
Although a plethora of research in financial economics has sought to address the issue of M&A value creation generally, the investigation of how value is created (or destroyed) and the examination of the question from a company fundamentals standpoint has largely been ignored. The bulk of the existing literature employs event study methodology as introduced and popularised by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) , which examines what impact, if any, mergers and acquisitions have on stock prices. In accordance with this methodology, a merger is branded successful if the combined entity equity returns equal or exceed those predicted by some standard benchmark model. For reasons argued below, this simplistic approach too often leads to a Type II error (i.e., the null hypothesis is not rejected when in fact it is false and should be rejected) with respect to the null hypothesis that M&A are value-creating transactions. We invite readers to review the evidence and arguments presented in this article and to judge whether the event study is an appropriate tool, let alone worthy of 'gold-standard' status by some financial economists, for tackling the question of whether M&A result in economic gains on an ex-post basis. We emphasise that this article does not constitute an attack on the event study in general, but rather an objection to the use of event studies as the main academic investigative tool in assessing whether M&A represent value-creating corporate events.
Short-window Event Study
From a short-run perspective, the most commonly studied event window encompasses the three or five days surrounding a merger announcement. From a theoretical standpoint, and in the context of an efficient market, changes in stock market valuations around merger announcements should fully capture the economic gains (or losses) from merging. Following this argument, it is often argued that the abnormal returns measured during the short-run event window (if any), represent reliable predictors of the success (or failure) of the M&A transactions under evaluation. The event study literature is unanimous in stating that target firm shareholders enjoy a significant positive cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around merger announcements. This finding, however, should be expected and merely represents a statement of the obvious. Intuitively, target firm shareholders expect to receive a premium if they are to hand over their ownership stakes to the acquiring firm and/or if the bidding firm is hoping, via the attractiveness of its bid, to persuade the target firm's board of directors to issue a public statement in recommendation of the offer. It should therefore come as no surprise that positive CARs accrue to target firm shareholders during the period surrounding merger announcements. Provided the acquisition involves a target that is believed to remain a going concern, the CARs earned by the target firm shareholders will invariably be positive as long as a positive premium is offered, irrespective of the identity of the bidder and perhaps even of the synergy potential between the bidder and its target.
The effect of takeover announcements on the acquiring firms' share prices is far from clear. On the one hand, some short-window event studies have found that no or small significant positive abnormal returns accrue to acquiring firm shareholders around merger announcements 1 . On the other hand, others have reported that acquirers experience significant but small negative abnormal returns over the same period 2 . In short, the general picture that emerges is that, from a short-window shareholder returns standpoint, M&A are clearly more beneficial to target firm shareholders than to their respective suitors, a fact that is widely acknowledged in the literature. This finding is not particularly encouraging however as it is, after all, the acquiring firm which makes the investment and ultimately continues on its journey.
Using a weighted-average approach based on firm size as measured by market capitalization allows for assessing how combined (target and acquirer) stock returns fare in the same event window. Many believe that this type of study enables us to evaluate the net aggregate economic impact from mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, some financial economists contend that this type of analysis enables us to assess whether or not M&A result in real economic gains or whether these transactions simply involve a transfer of wealth from one entity to the other (i.e., a zero-sum game). The literature broadly concludes that the combined entity earns a small, albeit positive CAR 3 1 See, for example, Dodd and Ruback (1977) ; Asquith (1983) ; Asquith, Bruner and Mullins, Jr. (1983) ; Dennis and McConnell (1986); Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) ; Franks and Harris (1989) .
around the merger announcement. But are conclusions from such studies sufficient to draw high level inferences about the true value creation potential or desirability of M&A? Many believe so. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) refer to short-window event studies as: "The most statistically reliable evidence on whether mergers create value for shareholders…"; they go on to conclude that:
"Based on the announcement-period stock market response, we conclude that mergers create value on behalf of the shareholders of the combined firms". This, we argue, is surely a premature conclusion as the hefty premiums paid (which could turn out to be overpayments especially under agency or hubris motives) blur the picture of whether M&A truly represent beneficial corporate events. More specifically, the premiums offered to target firm shareholders distort or bias weighted average return calculations.
Let us now explain in more detail why we believe that short-window event studies demonstrate very little with respect to the M&A value creation issue.
First, examining stock price movements around the merger announcement tells us little about the sources of economic gains that arise from combining the target and the acquirer (which is of course a high priority question for M&A practitioners). Shelton (1988) writes: "value is created when the assets are used more effectively by the combined entity than by the target and the bidder separately". Short-window event studies do nothing to test this statement. In fact, short-window event studies and their associated conclusions rely on strict assumptions in respect of market efficiency.
However, it is possible that investors systematically over or under-react to merger announcements, which could result in stock prices temporarily deviating from their fundamental levels. If this is accepted to be possible, the event-study's ability to distinguish real economic gains from market inefficiency is compromised. As Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) This issue can be illustrated with a simple example. Assume that a cash tender offer is made by 'Bidder Inc.' for the acquisition of 'Target Inc.' One month prior to the takeover announcement, the market value (MV) of Bidder Inc. is $100,000,000, with a stock price trading at $2 per share, while Target Inc. has a market value of $10,000,000 and a stock price of $1 per share. We employ the CAPM as our simple benchmark model and assume a risk-free rate (r f ) of 2% and a market risk premium of 6%. We also make the assumption that Bidder and Target have a beta of 1 and 2
respectively. According to our selected benchmark model, the annual expected returns for the Bidder and Target firms are therefore 8% and 14% respectively 5 , or 6.67 basis point (bp) and 11.67 bp respectively during a three-day window 6 . Based on this information, the relative size of the target to the bidder is 10%, which implies that weights in calculating the weighted average cumulative abnormal return (WACAR)
for the combined entity would be W b = 90.9% and W t = 9.1% respectively 7 . Now suppose that the acquirer announces a cash offer at $1.40 per share for the target, which represents a premium of 40% per share purchased. In a relatively efficient market, the price of the target's share price will adjust to the offer price quickly.
Hence, the market price of Target Inc.'s shares should shoot up to the $1.40 range in the three days surrounding the announcement. This necessarily implies that the threeday CAR for the target would be just shy of 40% 8 . Because the target in this example is small relative to the acquirer, it is not unreasonable to assume that the acquirer should earn the expected rate of return in the three days surrounding the announcement. 9 Thus, on a weighted-average net aggregate basis, the combined entity's CAR (WACAR) would be around 3.63 % 10 . According to short-window event study proponents, there is no question that the acquisition in this example would be branded as having been value-creating and therefore desirable.
Changing the example slightly, assume that Bidder Inc.'s shareholders do not share the same optimism regarding the union because they believe that their management is 5 Bidder expected return based on CAPM: E(R b ) = r f + b (R m -r f ) = 2% + 1(6%) = 8%. Target return calculated on the same basis although beta = 2. 6 The three-day window expected return for the bidder is: (3/360)*8% = 6.67bp; Target: (3/360)*14% = 11.67bp. For simplicity, we do not adjust the beta estimates for the short-window returns calculation. 7 Weights are determined as follow: W t = MV t /(MV t +MV b ) = W t = 10,000,000 /(110,000,000) = 9.09%, and W b = 1-W t = 90.91%. 8 CAR = Actual Return -Expected return = 40.00%-0.12% = 39.88%. 11.67bp is rounded to 0.12% for simplicity. 9 Prior research shows that on average acquirers break even in the few days surrounding merger announcements. See, for instance, Asquith (1983) , Dennis and McMconnell (1986) , Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) , Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) , etc. 10 WACAR = W t (CAR t ) + W b (CAR b ) = (9.09%)*(39.88%) + (90.91%)*(0%) = 3.63%.
paying too much to acquire Target Inc., or because they fear that the acquisition signals the beginning of a buying spree by the bidder. Thus, shareholders may decide to sell Bidder Inc.'s shares, which may result in the acquiring firm earning a negative CAR around the merger announcement (Assume CAR= -2.00%) 11 . Using the same weights and premium as described above, the WACAR for the combined entity will still be approximately 1.81%. That is, the negative bidder CAR of -2.00% corresponds to $2,000,000 of bidding firm market value destruction and yet event study proponents would continue to designate this acquisition as having been valuecreating 12 . All else being equal, the acquiring firm shareholders in this example could earn a negative return as large as 3.92% (which corresponds to a market value loss of $3,920,000) and the acquisition would still have been considered a success owing to the large target premium which supports the positive result of the weighted-average calculation 13 . This illustrates what we call the premium exacerbation problem. The practical interpretation of this example however, is that acquiring firm shareholders of the going concern entity (the acquirer) have suffered a -3.92% loss in value in the three days surrounding the merger announcement (-470% annualised) 14 which compares to a benchmark annual expected return of 8% for the bidder and despite this, event study proponents would have the audacity to claim that this acquisition has been 'value creating'; such a conclusion is clearly misguided and is illustrative of the reasons why decades of academic research into M&A based on the event study methodology have failed to make it anywhere near corporate boardrooms (Shojai, 2009 ).
In reality, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stultz (2004) report that the mean premium paid for over 12,000 U.S. takeover transactions with announcement dates between 1980 and 2001 was 68% for large firms and 62% for small firms, which necessarily implies that, according to our illustration, most (if not all) M&A transactions evaluated using a short-window event study approach will generate a positive 11 In three-day window, Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) find that the abnormal return is approximately 0% for bidders, regardless of the benchmark model used. An abnormal return of -2% therefore represents an exaggerated estimate to prove our point. 12 WACAR = W t (CAR t ) + W b (CAR b ) = (9.09%)*(39.88%) + (90.91%)*(-2%) = 1.81%. Bidder market capitalisation of $100,000,000 * -2% = -$ 2,000,000 of lost bidding firm market value. 13 We use the goal seek function in Excel to solve for the bidder return (-3.92%) which, holding the remainder of the example constant, will yield a WACAR of 0%. On a base market capitalization of $100,000,000, this level of return translates into a bidding firm market capitalization loss of $3,920,000 14 -3.92% x (360/3) = -470.40%
weighted-average CAR and will therefore be branded as being successful, or valuecreating, in spite of the potentially significantly negative returns accruing to acquiring firms during the same period. The WACAR is almost invariably positive, and the problem is compounded when the relative size of the target to the acquirer increases.
Indeed, premiums offered may easily represent overpayments (Roll, 1986 Malatesta (1983) argues that the widely used percentage abnormal returns do not capture the real wealth changes of acquiring firm shareholders. However, dollar returns capture the wealth change of acquiring firm shareholders.
measure indicates that acquiring firm shareholders lose a total of $240 billion over the window spanning from -2 to +1 days around the merger announcement (a result which is explained by the significant dollar losses generated by some of the larger-size wealth-destroying acquisitions in the sample). Upon further investigation, they also find that the losses to acquirers exceeded the gains to targets, resulting in a net aggregate dollar loss of $134 billion during the same window. These findings provide interesting but rather painful evidence that if we merely rely on the short-run event study result (i.e., the three-day CAR 0.69%), we run the risk of According to short-window event studies, mergers and acquisitions are valuecreating transactions. So why is there so much controversy surrounding the desirability of M&A? That is, why do event study results stand in such sharp contrast with the growing rhetoric that creating value through M&A is easier said than done 18 ?
And why do event study results stand in such stark contrast with investor experience?
It is widely acknowledged that many recent mergers have proven to be total disasters.
Even consultancy firms, which derive significant income in advising companies on M&A-related matters, have documented the widespread nature of these failures 19 .
Academic studies have also exposed the high prevalence of divestitures after acquisitions 20 17 The sharp contrast between the CAR and the shareholder wealth effect signals the possibility of a Type II error (if the CAR is used) in respect of the null hypothesis that M&A are value-creating corporate events.
. If mergers are truly value-creating transactions due to real economic 18 "Evidence suggests that the majority of acquisitions do not benefit shareholders in the long term.
Valuations and premiums tend to be excessively high and targets impossible to achieve". --Financial Times 2004. 19 See for instance, Lajoux and Weston (1998) for an overview of several practitioner study results. 20 See for instance, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) .
gains and not market mispricings, it is highly unlikely that acquirers would divest recent purchases at such a high frequency, nor would there be so much controversy surrounding the desirability of M&A generally.
Hitherto, we have shown that it may be naive to conclude that M&A are valuecreating transactions based solely on the prevalence of positive CARs or even weighted-average abnormal returns around merger announcements. In many cases, target firm shareholders may be the only ones who gain anything from the transactions, and possibly to the detriment of acquiring firms. But in retrospect, examining how target shareholders fared around the bid announcement has very little relevance to the questions being asked by M&A practitioners. Undeniably, at the merger announcement and the few days surrounding it, we know very little about any future possible negative drift in the acquirer's share price, or whether acquiring firm managers will succeed at unlocking synergies. We ought to be much more concerned about the firm that makes the investment and ultimately carries on: the acquiring firm.
Long-window Event Study
A second strand of the literature examines the long-run post-merger stock performance of the acquirer and its absorbed target, or the 'combined entity'. In general, this strand of the literature converges on the notion that acquiring firms underperform their benchmark returns in the post-merger period; this is often referred to in the literature as the 'long-run merger underperformance anomaly'. Some researchers have asked whether 'overpayments' could be responsible for the long-run negative drift in share price after acquisitions 21 . In one study however, (See Antoniou, Arbour and Zhao, 2008a), the authors were unable to establish such a relationship statistically. Although we concur that it makes more sense to examine bidder firm results and bidder shareholder returns to ascertain the desirability of M&A on an ex post basis, we argue that long-run event studies also fail to provide interesting insights due to the following shortcomings:
21 Schwert (2003) states: '…One interpretation of this evidence (post merger underperformance) is that bidders overpay and that it takes the market some time to gradually learn about this mistake'.
First and foremost is the methodological problem associated with long-run event studies. For instance, bad model problems imply that it is simply not possible to accurately measure expected returns, thus rendering futile the analysis of long-run abnormal returns, particularly as the event window lengthens. In addition to the bad model problem, a number of researchers have pointed out that the process used in calculating and testing long-run abnormal returns is in itself biased. For example, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) At least conceptually, the use of the pooling method was meant to be reserved for transactions involving the 'merger of equals'. Due to a favourable impact on reported earnings (rather than economic earnings) however, acquirers began manipulating M&A transactions in order to 'qualify' for the use of the pooling method, partly based on the belief that the higher level of reported 23 Book value of equity to market value of equity. 24 Barber and Lyon (1997) But the very fact that acquirers previously enjoyed discretion over their choice of merger accounting method compromises the ability of financial economists to select relevant and unbiased control firms based on BE/ME as advocated in Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) . For instance, the two accounting techniques are fundamentally different in that under the purchase method, the offer price for the target is compared to the fair market value (FMV) of the net assets of the target, with the difference being capitalised on the balance sheet in the form of Goodwill 28 , which was previously required to be amortized over a period not exceeding 40 years (20 years under IAS GAAP), resulting in a lower level of reported earnings under this method 29 .
Under the pooling method however, operating results and prior-period accounts (i.e. assets and liabilities) were simply added together at their stated book values (irrespective of whether different accounting methods were historically used by the bidder and its target 30 ), with the concepts of FMV and Goodwill playing no part in the process. 26 The choice of accounting method should not impact cash flow. See, for example, Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker (1978) and Davis (1990) . 27 The pooling method requires the re-statement of historical financial accounts (in some cases well before the closing of the acquisition), as if the bidder and its target had been one firm all along. This makes de-ciphering the performance of each individual business very difficult. In the late 1990s, Tyco International Ltd., for instance, came under fire after pursuing a series of acquisitions which were accounted for under the pooling method, making it nearly impossible to compare one quarter to the next. --Businessweek 2001. 28 Under the purchase method, a positive differential between the offer price and the FMV of the target's net assets would first be allocated to identifiable intangibles (e.g. licenses, in-process research and development or patents), with the balance allocated to Goodwill. 29 As a compromise, when the pooling method was eventually abolished under US GAAP, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued statement no. 142, which specified that Goodwill would no longer be allowed to be amortized but rather would become the subject of an annual impairment test. 30 For instance, US GAAP allows both last-in-first-out (LIFO) and first-in-first-out (FIFO) inventory accounting methods.
Under the purchase method, the acquirer's post-merger equity book value 31 will remain equal to its original book equity, unless new equity is issued to finance the acquisition 32 . Under the pooling method however, the book value of equity will be equal to the sum of the historical book values of the acquirer and its target. In summary, if an acquisition is financed with equity, the purchase method should usually result in a higher book equity value because the offer price for the target will typically exceed the FMV of net assets of the target. But even under the same method (i.e. purchase), the resulting book equity account for the combined firm will vary depending on whether the acquisition is financed with cash or with stock 33 . The picture that emerges is that one cannot bundle into the same sample deals that were accounted for under different merger accounting methods while continuing to expect a justified benchmark result and therefore an unbiased test result. Unless the aforementioned factors are controlled for in the research design, the selection of control firms and therefore the calculation of expected returns becomes tricky and probably flawed. This in turn compromises the calculation of long-run abnormal returns, as well as the cross-sectional comparability of results. Although merger accounting intricacies go beyond the scope of this article, it is easily understood that such issues must be carefully analysed when applying popular long-run event study methodology. The literature has largely failed to control for these key issues.
31 Equity book value is defined as the sum of shareholder's equity and retained earnings. 32 Under the US GAAP variant, in-process research and development is required to be written off as part of the transaction, thereby reducing the retained earnings of the acquirer and impacting book value of equity. 33 Book equity values should generally be larger for stock-financed transactions (i.e., where an equity issuance has taken place) relative to acquisitions that are paid for in cash (i.e., financed either by a debt issuance or cash on balance sheet).
The above-mentioned merger accounting discussion significantly weakens the use of the so-called "state-of-the-art" bootstrap approach 34 advocated by Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) , Kothari and Warner (1997) , and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) and applied by Rau and Vermaelen (1998) in mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, the 1000 pseudo-portfolios matched in size and book-to-market ratio at the time of merger completion do not control for the aforementioned accounting issues, thereby calling into question the validity of obtained matches and thus the empirical distribution of abnormal returns generated under the approach.
But even if we control for merger accounting differences and all other possible sources of misspecification 35 , we are still far from obtaining an accurate and reliable long-run test result. In one attempt, Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) recommend two general approaches that control for common misspecification problems in long-run event studies. Despite the authors' positive intentions however, their simulated results confirm that well-specified test statistics (i.e., where empirical rejection levels are consistent with theoretical rejection levels) are only guaranteed in random samples, while misspecified test statistics are pervasive in non-random samples. We also know that mergers and acquisitions cluster in time and by industry, which necessarily implies that well-specified test statistics in long-run M&A event studies should hardly exist (see also Antoniou, Arbour and Zhao, 2008b) . The central message in their study, however, is that: "the analysis of long-run abnormal returns is treacherous".
Second, on a more general framework, Viswanathan and Wei (2004) provide a mathematical proof that the usual abnormal return (CAR/BHAR 36 34 As noted in Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) , the bootstrap approach avoids many problematic assumptions associated with conventional t-tests over long time horizons, namely normality, stationarity, and the time independence of sample observations. ) calculated in event studies has a negative expectation. They prove that, in any finite sample, the expected event abnormal return will invariably be negative and becomes more negative as the event window is lengthened. The implication of utmost importance here is that these negative results do not discriminate between successful or unsuccessful transactions, 35 Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) document that the misspecification of test statistics can generally be traced to 5 sources: the new listing bias, the rebalancing bias, the skewness bias, cross-sectional dependence, and bad models problems. 36 Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs).
suggesting that the so-called long-run M&A underperformance anomaly may not be anomalous at all.
In addition, Viswanathan and Wei go on to examine the above problem in infinite samples. They prove that, asymptotically, the event abnormal return converges to zero and hence they conclude that the negative long-run event abnormal return is simply a small sample problem. This again offers a reasonable explanation as to why some of Finally, the recent development of a series of new methodologies has given rise to a 'new wave' of long-run event studies 37 . Mitchell and Stafford (2000) , for instance, reexamine the long-run anomaly associated with corporate takeovers 38 . Their results suggest that acquirers (combined firms) earn the expected rate of return over the long run, thereby implying that mergers do not create nor destroy value, an idea which is consistent with that found in the previous paragraph.
But even if we were able to overcome all the methodological problems associated with long-window event studies, what level of insight could be gained from such a 'perfect' study? We know that stock price is forward looking and that, in a relatively efficient market, the price of an asset should reflect expectations regarding the underlying asset's future cash flows, based on information which is available today.
Therefore, the returns observed under long-window event studies (particularly in the latter years of the sample), ought to be discounting anticipated events that reach far beyond the merger or acquisition under analysis. For example, stock returns generated 5 years after an M&A transaction (t+5 years) should discount what is expected to happen in periods t+6, t+7, etc. But this extends so far beyond the actual transaction that occurred in year t that we fail to see the relevance of this analysis. We refer to this as the long-window forward expectations trap. Adding to event study's general malaise, confounding events (whether exogenous or endogenous) may further distort the inferences from long-run stock returns. All in all, long-term event studies fail to provide a means of identifying and isolating the effects of the actual merger that has previously taken place and thus do not provide much relevant insight about the micro or macro economic impact of M&A.
In light of the arguments presented thus far, we believe that event study methodology, for both short and long event windows, falls short of offering an economically sound tool for measuring merger performance on an ex-post basis.
Ironically, it is the assumption regarding market efficiency that is the downfall of both long-term and short-term event studies, but in different ways: in the case of the former, a reasonable degree of market efficiency should imply that long-run stock returns are probably irrelevant to the analysis of individual events at a fixed point in time, while in the case of the latter, markets are insufficiently efficient to reliably predict the outcome of a particular M&A transaction. In our view, financial economists have overindulged in event studies, which have largely yielded results which are biased, unreliable and lack insight. Although we can see the merits of tackling the M&A value-creation debate from an investor experience standpoint 39 , we believe the debate is best served when approached from a different perspective: that of company fundamentals.
Fundamental Analysis
'Unlocking synergies' is the most commonly cited managerial motivation for undertaking M&A (Walter and Barney 1990) . If synergies truly exist, economic gains from mergers should thus show up in the combined firm's fundamentals. Coming back to Shelton's definition of value creation, it is clear that the concept has less to do with share price movements (at least in terms of aetiology), and more to do with asset reorganizations, and improvements in a number of financial performance metrics and key performance indicators relevant to the firm/sector under analysis. Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) postulate that gains to shareholders must be real economic gains via the efficient rearrangement of resources. Consistent with basic finance principles, improvements in company fundamentals should drive capital gains. As such, we believe that the analysis of the desirability of M&A begins not with stock returns (the symptom), but rather with the underlying factors/fundamentals which drive cash flows (the cause), which in turn power shareholder returns.
In addition to short and long-window event studies, there is a small body of literature that examines pre and post-merger operational performance of acquiring firms. In short, a value-creating transaction is one that is associated with some measurable improvement (a relative improvement at a minimum) in company fundamentals. Furthermore, if purported synergies are real, and cash flows do improve, we should be able to identify the sources of any such real economic gains.
Managers undertaking M&A for synergistic reasons rather than for hubris-related motives must have identified possible sources of economic gains before proceeding with the transaction. These types of studies are more conducive to performance evaluation on an ex-post basis in our view and they are also more likely to contain information that can be used and applied by business school students and M&A practitioners generally.
In a 1992 journal article, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback find that the 50 largest mergers between US public industrial firms completed between 1979-1984 experienced higher operating cash flow returns, mainly due to post-merger improvements in asset productivity. They also report that such improvements do not come at the expense of cutbacks in capital expenditure or research and development (R&D) spending, thereby undermining the claim that the improvement in post-merger cash flows is achieved at the expense of the acquiring firms' long-run viability/competitiveness. These results are similar to Kaplan (1989) , although the latter author finds that merged firms reduce capital expenditure in the three years following the merger. In short, both studies indicate that merging was probably a desirable course of action, as evidenced by the fact that acquiring firms appeared to enjoy better economic strength relative to peers during the post-acquisition period. Another problem arises in the computation of meaningful industry averages due to the fact that firms operate across multiple industries and geographies, which obscures the process of identifying relevant pure-play benchmarks for calculating industryadjusted results and ratios. The selected benchmark should ideally be limited to relevant comparable firms that have chosen not to merge. However, we know and recognise that mergers come in waves and cluster by industry, which poses a research design challenge given the currently statistically-focused foundation of academic 40 Profit and loss (P&L) 41 Goodwill, for example, should be excluded for better comparability of results across time periods and across sample firms.
research into M&A 42 . If our call for new research methods is heard and answered, we would not be surprised if this meant the end of the large-sample statistically-oriented studies in favour of smaller, almost 'case-study-like' research that focuses on select peer groups, with analytical emphasis placed on 'softer' elements of post-merger integration including managerial compensation, the selection of advisors, the creation of M&A oversight committees for combined firms, through to the robustness of 180-day post-acquisitions plans and 'heat maps' of where synergies may lie between a bidder and its target. Although these studies are likely to suffer from their own methodological weaknesses, they can only represent an improvement relative to the current crop of event studies which have dismally failed to produce any meaningful and usable insights on the issue of M&A value creation.
Conclusion: Is it Time for a Change?
Since its birth in 1969, the event study has held a virtual monopoly over academia's various attempts to shed light on the M&A value creation debate. We argue that the event study has stagnated in terms of its incremental insights into M&A. Among other things, the event study's shortcomings include the hefty premiums offered to target shareholders, which exacerbate the short-run weighted-average CARs for combined entities, and this in turn has misled many researchers into concluding that most M&A transactions represent value-creating events. Furthermore, we show that cumulative abnormal returns observed around merger announcements can produce poor estimates of shareholder wealth effects. We also discuss various problems inherent to longwindow event studies and we conclude that such studies are also unsuitable for measuring the economic gains of M&A due to various methodological problems and the forward-looking nature of stock returns. In short, both short and long-window event studies provide biased results and undependable insights regarding the question of M&A value creation.
In the wake of multiple merger waves that appear to be growing in strength and size every time the tide comes in, financial economists and finance students can no longer afford to use research methods that do little more than reinforce the obsolete 42 The small-sample bias is often regarded as a shortcoming for studies in financial economics. Encouragingly, we expect for the divide between IFRS and US GAAP to continue to narrow over time, in line with the globalisation of the investing practice and of the investor base. We therefore believe that the M&A value creation puzzle can be better understood by returning to fundamentals. If the very businesses that are studied in the academic research merely ensure their own survival by continuously reinventing themselves to successfully meet the evolving needs of consumers, while continuously facing up to the ever-lurking threats of competition, complacency and obsolescence, then why should research into M&A not be subject to the same Darwinian forces?
